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A Report from the Economic Research Service
Abstract
Interest in revenue-based commodity support is evident in the Food, Conservation and 
Energy Act of 2008 (the 2008 Farm Bill), which gives eligible producers the option of 
participating in the Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program in return for reduc-
tions and eliminations of payments under more traditional programs. This report exam-
ines how the uncertainty in U.S. domestic commodity support payments for corn may 
differ between traditional-style approaches (deﬁ  ned as price-based payments plus yield-
based disaster payments) to support and two revenue-based support scenarios. Variability 
around the total expected annual payment was found to be lower under revenue-based 
support, as was the probability of high payments. These results suggest potential advan-
tages to this type of support, both in terms of lower budgetary uncertainty for the Federal 
Government and in better ensuring that agricultural support outlays stay below a certain 
ceiling. In addition, the volatility of corn revenue was found to be lower in almost all 
corn producing counties under the revenue-based alternatives than under the traditional 
price-based approaches. 
Keywords: Domestic commodity support, revenue-based support, marketing loan 
beneﬁ  ts, countercyclical payments, disaster assistance, Federal crop insurance 
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Summary
Traditional commodity support, in the form of countercyclical payments and 
marketing loan beneﬁ  ts, pays producers when prices fall below speciﬁ  ed levels, 
but does not compensate them for yield losses. Congress historically provides 
disaster assistance, or compensation for shortfalls in yield, only on an ad hoc 
basis. Providing price and yield compensation in separate programs means that 
producers may receive support when they do not need it, or not receive support 
when they do need it. An alternative to separate price- and yield-based support 
programs would be to determine a national or regional payment rate based on 
shortfalls in revenue from an expected or target revenue.
What Is the Issue?
Using revenue as the basis for commodity program payments may be more 
efﬁ  cient than a price- or yield-based program in reducing ﬁ  nancial risk 
because of the inverse correlation between yields and prices. For example, a 
farmer who suffers a complete yield loss will not receive a payment under a 
price-based program. Widespread yield losses can boost prices above price 
program trigger levels, providing little or no assistance when producers 
have little product to market. Conversely, high yields, by increasing supply, 
can cause crop prices to fall, triggering payments to producers even though 
production and, potentially, revenue are high. Interest in revenue-based 
commodity support is evident in the Food, Conservation and Energy Act 
of 2008 (the 2008 Farm Bill), which offers eligible producers the option to 
participate in the Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program.
What Did the Study Find?
To investigate the policy implications of revenue support programs, this 
report compares the distribution of support payments for corn under a tradi-
tional-style program scenario (price-based payments and yield-based disaster 
payments) versus two theoretical revenue-based program scenarios, one 
based on revenue shortfalls with respect to a target revenue and one based on 
shortfalls with respect to an expected market revenue. 
Under traditional price-based programs—marketing loan beneﬁ  ts or counter 
cyclical payments—payments are triggered when market prices fall below 
the statutory price ﬂ  oor (loan rates and target prices). These prices are 
ﬁ  xed for the life of the Farm Act legislation. The target revenue scenario 
extends this approach to the revenue case, i.e., the revenue ﬂ  oor in the target 
revenue program is expected yield times a ﬁ  xed statutory price. In contrast, 
the revenue ﬂ  oor in the market revenue program is expected yield times the 
expected price at harvest time, where the expected price changes from year to 
year as dictated by market conditions.  
For the computer simulations, commodity program parameters were chosen 
so that the expected value of total national payments is the same across price 
and revenue-based programs. Hence, from a national perspective (e.g., the 
taxpayer), the programs differ only in the variability (or volatility) of payments 
and in differing probabilities of making any particular level of payments.iv
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Both types of revenue-based program scenarios offer the potential for less 
variable payment outlays from year to year (beneﬁ  ting the Government) 
and less variability in farm revenue (beneﬁ  ting the producer) than current 
approaches. Computer simulations also suggest that both revenue-based 
schemes result in a lower likelihood of high payments or overcompensation. 
These results suggest that revenue-based support would reduce budgetary 
uncertainty for the Federal Government and better ensure that agricultural 
support outlays stay below a predetermined ceiling, as required under some 
multilateral trade commitments.
In addition, the computer simulations suggest that variability of corn revenue 
(the coefﬁ  cient of variation) was lower in almost all corn-producing counties 
under the revenue-based alternatives than under the traditional price-based 
approaches. The reduction in revenue volatility was most pronounced in the 
Corn Belt counties.
Finally, whether farmers prefer one type of support program over another 
depends on its impact on mean revenue and the variability of revenue. While 
revenue-based support scenarios generally reduced the downside risk of 
farming more than did the current-style support, farmer preferences for type 
of support would depend on their preferences for increasing mean returns 
versus decreasing the variability of returns. 
How Was the Study Conducted?
To investigate the policy implications of revenue support programs, this 
report compares the statistical distribution of payments from hypothetical 
revenue-based programs to those from a suite of programs similar to the 
traditional set of commodity support programs. While probability-based 
program analysis, as used in legally required government cost estimates, 
summarizes the distribution of program costs into mean estimates, other 
summary statistics—such as the variance and skewness (shape) of the distri-
bution—are useful too. The estimated payment distributions have implica-
tions both for government policy and for farm-level beneﬁ  ts. Actual program 
payments are sensitive to a broad array of program provisions, and seemingly 
small changes in these can cause large changes in payment levels. Hence, to 
make the support programs comparable, the study’s program scenarios were 
designed to differ only in the fundamental program provisions. 1
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Introduction and Overview
Most farm legislation at the Federal level is contained in “Farm Acts,” which 
ﬁ  rst authorized farm income support in the form of commodity payments 
in the 1930s (Bowers et al., 1984). Support—in the form of countercyclical 
payments (CCPs) and marketing loan beneﬁ  ts (MLBs)—makes payments to 
producers in response to price shortfalls. Commodity support not covered in 
the Farm Act includes ad hoc disaster assistance and Federal crop insurance. 
This report focuses on CCPs, MLBs, ad hoc disaster assistance, and a new 
class of revenue-based support. 
While CCPs and MLBs target low prices, ad hoc disaster assistance gener-
ally targets low yields. However, farm returns per acre, as measured in terms 
of revenue, are price times yield.  While longstanding support for program 
crops (corn, for example) addresses revenue, it does not do so in a coordi-
nated fashion. In particular, government payments are typically triggered 
by price or yield shortfalls and, until the 2008 Farm Act, did not calcu-
late payments based on revenue shortfalls. As a result, traditional support 
programs can over- or undercompensate producers relative to changes in 
their gross revenue. 
The 2008 Farm Act, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (Public 
Law 110-246), allows an eligible producer to receive revenue-based support 
in the Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program. In return, the 
producer forgoes payments under one price-based payment program, and 
accedes to reduced payments under another price-based support program and 
to a reduction in a ﬁ  xed payment (USDA/ERS, 2008; Zulauf et al., 2008). 
A revenue-based support program could be more efﬁ  cient than the traditional 
suite of uncoordinated commodity support programs and disaster assistance 
programs in that payments are more closely aligned to actual changes in 
farm revenue. If prices and yields are inversely related, the revenue-based 
approach may offer less variable payment outlays from year to year than the 
longstanding forms of support—even if mean total payments are the same 
between the two forms of support. In such a case, a high level of payments 
may also be less likely under revenue-based support. 
Rather than focus speciﬁ  cally on the new ACRE program, which has a 
complex mechanism for setting payments and will not provide coverage 
until the 2009 crop year, this report provides an overview of revenue-based 
domestic commodity support alternatives in general. 
Traditional Forms of 
Domestic Commodity Support
Direct commodity price and income support to producers under Title I of the 
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (abbreviated throughout 
this report as “2002 Farm Act”) was primarily provided in the form of 
direct payments, countercyclical payments, and marketing assistance loan 
beneﬁ  ts (i.e., marketing loan gains, loan deﬁ  ciency payments, and certiﬁ  cate 
exchange gains). For more detailed discussion of these programs, see USDA 2
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(2006) and USDA/ERS (2007a). These forms of support continue with the 
2008 Farm Act, but with some relatively minor changes. 
Direct and countercyclical payments cover producers with base acres of feed 
grains (corn, sorghum, barley, and oats), wheat, oilseeds (e.g., soybeans), 
upland cotton, rice, peanuts, and pulse crops (only for countercyclical 
payments). In addition, these commodities and a number of other crops 
(including extra-long staple (ELS) cotton, honey, wool, and mohair) are 
eligible for marketing assistance loan beneﬁ  ts.1 Thus, these “program” crops 
are those covered by standard commodity programs.2 Commodity support 
in the form of subsidized crop insurance is offered under the Federal Crop 
Insurance Act of 1980, as amended by the Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 
2000. In addition, ad hoc disaster and/or market loss assistance has been autho-
rized by Congress for most years since 1988. 
Countercyclical Payments
The Direct and Countercyclical Payment Program (DCP), as authorized 
under the 2008 Farm Act, provides payments to eligible farmers and land-
owners on farms enrolled for the 2008−2012 crop years. Direct payments 
are ﬁ  xed and do not vary with current crop production or price (USDA/
ERS, 2007a; FSA, 2006; OMB, 2008).3 Like direct payments, a producer’s 
countercyclical (CCP) payments are not tied to current production, but apply 
whenever the effective price is less than a statutory target price (USDA/
ERS, 2007a; FSA, 2006). CCPs are based on farm-level historical base acres 
and program yields, and so do not depend on current production. As such, 
they are less distorting than payments tied to actual production (USDA/ERS, 
2002; pp. 27 to 28). However, since CCP payments are tied to current prices, 
they are more distorting than direct payments. Because they are neither price 
nor yield sensitive, direct payments are not included in the scenario analysis.
Marketing Loan Beneﬁ  ts 
The nonrecourse marketing assistance loan program provides income support 
at a per-unit price, or loan payment rate (USDA/ERS, 2007a; USDA/FSA, 
2003). While CCPs use the national loan payment rates, the marketing 
assistance loan program uses county-level rates. The program is intended 
to provide ﬁ  nancial liquidity to producers after harvest for more orderly 
marketing, while minimizing price distortions and the buildup of govern-
ment stocks. Unlike CCPs, marketing assistance beneﬁ  ts require production 
of the speciﬁ  c program commodity. Farmers may request a marketing assis-
tance loan after harvesting the program commodity, pledging the harvested 
commodity as collateral.
When market prices are below the loan rate plus accrued interest, farmers 
are allowed to repay their loan at a loan repayment rate (reﬂ  ecting market 
prices) that is lower than the loan rate (except for extra-long staple cotton). 
A producer realizes a marketing loan gain if the loan is repaid at less than 
the loan principal. The marketing loan “gain” per unit of crop output is the 
amount by which the loan rate exceeds the loan repayment rate. Marketing 
assistance loans have a 9-month maturity and accrue interest, but if the loan 
repayment rate is less than the principal plus accrued interest, the interest 
need not be repaid (USDA/FSA, 2007). The loan is nonrecourse in that, 
 1 For ELS cotton, the producer must 
repay the loan at the loan rate (plus 
accrued interest and other charges), 
and ELS cotton is not eligible for loan 
deﬁ  ciency payments.
 2 Programs for milk and sugar, which 
support market prices by restricting 
marketable supplies, are not covered in 
this report.
 3 The terminology for direct payments 
can be confusing. All commodity-related 
payments made directly to farmers are 
categorized as “direct payments” or 
“direct cash payments” in the Federal 
budget. The decoupled payments made to 
farmers are known as “Direct Payments.”  
We capitalize this speciﬁ  c form of pay-
ment to distinguish it from the general 
category of direct cash payments.3
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for most program crops, the government must accept the collateral as full 
payment of the loan at loan maturity if a producer so chooses.
A farmer can alternatively choose to receive the marketing loan beneﬁ  t as 
a cash payment (loan deﬁ  ciency payment), or LDP, if the repayment rate is 
less than the loan rate. The farmer taking the LDP is free to sell the crop on 
the open market after receiving the LDP. Marketing loan gains and LDPs are 
both referred to as marketing loan beneﬁ  ts (MLBs). 
Economic Rationale for Revenue-Based 
Commodity Support
The gross revenue of a producer is price times output, and so will change 
with changes in price or yield.  Traditional commodity support, in the form 
of CCPs and MLBs, pays producers when prices fall below speciﬁ  ed levels, 
but does not compensate them for yield losses. Traditional disaster assistance 
does, but in ad hoc fashion, and does not necessarily compensate for low 
prices. Marketing loss assistance payments, most of which occurred over 
1999-2001, addressed market losses associated with low prices, but again in 
ad hoc fashion. Until the 2008 Farm Act, Congress provides disaster assis-
tance only after constituent requests for aid and contingent on budget consid-
erations. In contrast, CCPs and MLBs apply whenever market prices fall 
enough to trigger payments, as determined by the program parameters. 
Providing price and yield compensation separately means that producers may 
receive support when they do not need it, or not receive support when they 
need it. For example, a farmer who suffers a complete yield loss will not 
receive a payment under a price-based program that is tied to current produc-
tion (i.e., the MLB).
Revenue-Based Support Better Targets 
the Producer’s Bottom Line 
An alternative to separate price- and yield-based support programs would be 
to determine a national or regional payment rate based on shortfalls in market 
revenue from an expected or target revenue (e.g., Miranda and Glauber, 
1991; Babcock and Hart, 2005; Zulauf, 2006; American Farmland Trust, 
2007a; National Corn Growers Association, 2006; Cooper, 2009b). 
A revenue support program may be more efﬁ  cient than the longstanding 
suite of direct commodity support programs and ad hoc disaster assistance as 
it more directly targets the producer’s bottom line. Revenue-based support 
was included in the 2007 farm bill proposals from the Administration, and in 
the House of Representatives and Senate-passed farm bills.4 Under the 2008 
Farm Act, producers can choose the ACRE program in lieu of the traditional 
suite of support payments. ACRE’s revenue-based payment rates are deter-
mined by State (USDA/ERS, 2008; Zulauf et al., 2008).
The beneﬁ  ts of targeting revenue rather than price or yield separately hold even 
when price and yield move independently of each other. However, an addi-
tional advantage of revenue-based support occurs when prices are inversely 
correlated with national average yield (that is, market prices fall as national 
  4The House and Senate bills are titled 
the “Farm, Nutrition, and Bioenergy 
Act of 2007” and  “The Food and Ener-
gy Security Act of 2007,” respectively. 
Among other differences, the revenue 
program in the House bill would have 
used a national level payment rate, and 
the Senate’s State level payment rate.4
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average yield increases).5 This negative yield-price relationship means that a 
farmer’s revenue is less variable from year to year than it would be otherwise. 
The more negative the correlation, the greater the offsetting relationship (or 
“natural hedge”) that works to stabilize revenues.6  For instance, a drought 
in a major growing region can lower aggregate yield, but the resulting price 
increase will compensate to some extent for the yield decrease.7
To the extent that this “natural hedge” exists, commodity support programs 
that target only price variability can systematically over- or undercompensate 
farmers who already have a natural hedge. For example, large yield increases 
nationally can reduce prices below target prices, triggering countercyclical 
payments. However, the higher yields offset to some extent the effect of lower 
prices on revenue. Countercyclical payments ignore this positive revenue 
factor, and can overcompensate for the revenue decline. Conversely, prices 
tend to rise with large yield decreases, thereby reducing countercyclical 
payments, which then undercompensate producers for this decline in revenue. 
The offsetting price-yield relationship can make revenue-based support 
programs appealing from a Federal budgetary standpoint. Since revenue will 
tend to be less variable than price, revenue-based support programs have the 
potential to lower year-to-year variability in payments. However, revenue-
based support is sensitive to factors like expected price and yield levels, 
program parameters, and general program design.
As revenue-based crop insurance has become a major part of the Federal crop 
insurance program (Dismukes and Coble, 2006), the rationale at play there 
would seem to apply to direct support as well. However, Title I support is 
provided free of cost to the producer, while the farmer must pay an insurance 
premium (albeit a subsidized one) for   Federal crop insurance. Also, eligibility 
for crop insurance payments requires that the farmer plant or intended to plant 
a crop, whereas some forms of Title I support (direct payments and CCPs) 
do not require planting of a crop. Federal crop revenue insurance protects the 
farmer against decreases in revenue relative to expected revenue—as the name 
suggests, it is insurance. Title I support can offer price protection (in the form 
of CCPs and marketing loan beneﬁ  ts) relative to a statutory guarantee that 
may be above market expectations. Hence, Title I payments can raise average 
revenue, and not just address revenue variability.8
Implementation of revenue-based support might reduce or eliminate calls for 
ad hoc disaster assistance due to its inclusion of yield in payment calcula-
tions. However, this reduction is not a given, especially if the correlation 
between the revenue support payments and yield-related losses is low, or if 
producers believe that the program’s revenue guarantee is set too low. While 
these last two points are not drawbacks speciﬁ  c to revenue-based support 
(they apply as well to price-based support), lowering the need for ad hoc 
assistance is a possible motivation for moving to revenue-based support. 
Graphical Depiction of Yield 
and Price-Yield Correlations
The motivation for revenue-based payments based on the natural hedge 
(inverse price-yield relationship) can be illustrated with maps correlating 
county yields with national average yield and correlating county yield 
 5 This situation occurs in major pro-
duction regions when regional changes 
in production affect aggregate supply 
and thus commodity prices.
 6 This can be shown mathematically 
using the formula for the variance of the 
product of two non-independent vari-
ables (for example, Goodman, 1960).
 7 Note that the “natural hedge” helps 
to insure producers against yield drops, 
given that the price increase caused by 
the yield drop will be proportionately 
higher than if the price-yield correlation 
was zero. On the other hand, with the 
natural hedge, a yield increase will pro-
duce a proportionally greater decrease in 
price than if the price-yield correlation 
was zero. This dichotomy of the impact 
of the “natural hedge” on crop revenues 
was summarized by Neil Harl as “... the 
only thing worse for a farmer than bad 
weather is good weather” (quoted in 
Goodwin, 2000, p. 76).
 8 What is likely to be more speciﬁ  -
cally of interest to the farmer than how 
a support program lowers the variabil-
ity of total revenue is how the program 
lowers downside risk in total revenue. 
However, variability is a convenient 
proxy for a measure of downside risk.5
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and national price.9 Figures 1 and 2 show the correlation between county 
average yields and national average yield based on 1975-2005 data for corn 
and cotton.  In both ﬁ  gures, the larger the (positive) correlation (shown as 
progressively darker shades of green), the more suggestive that the county 
yield moves with the national average yield.  Changes in corn yield tend to 
be quite uniform across the Heartland (the major corn growing region, span-
ning Iowa and Illinois). Yields in the Heartland dominate national average 
yield, and most other regions are peripheral players in determining national 
average yield (ﬁ  g. 1). For upland cotton, several regions with high correla-
tions of county yield and national yield – for example, the Lower Mississippi 
region, and regions of California, Texas, and the Carolinas – are dispersed 
widely across the southern United States, from one coast to another (ﬁ  g. 2).10
Figures 3 and 4 show correlation between county yield and national price for 
corn and upland cotton, again based on 1975-2005 data.11 The more nega-
tive (inverse) the relationship between price and yield, the greater the natural 
hedge inherent in revenue. For corn (ﬁ  g. 3), the negative correlation between 
corn price and yield in the Heartland area suggests an inherent natural hedge 
between price and yield in that region, with lower prices being somewhat 
offset by higher yields, and vice versa. Hence, for the government, the direct 
targeting of revenue changes with a revenue-based program may mean less 
variable program costs due to the lower likelihood of systemic underpay-
ments or overpayments than with a price-based system. 
  9The Pearson correlation can take on 
values from -1 to 1, and is a measure of 
the relationship between two random 
variables. A correlation of -1 means 
that the two variables move in opposite 
directions in a perfectly linear fashion 
(i.e., the movements track along a 
straight line). A correlation of 1 means 
that the two variables move in the same 
direction in a perfectly linear fashion  
A correlation of 0 means that there is 
no relationship between the variables. 
The relationship gets stronger as the 
correlation moves from a value of 0 
towards -1 or 1. See Appendix C for a 
discussion of the relationship between 
the correlation and the mean and vari-
ability of revenue.
 10In ﬁ  gure 2, the broad geographic 
area of high correlation in California 
should not be taken as an indication 
that the counties in the San Joaquin 
Valley are dominating U.S. cotton pro-
duction, but simply that the large size 
of these counties can exaggerate their 
apparent inﬂ  uence.
 11The price-yield correlations shown 
in ﬁ  gures 3 and 4 are speciﬁ  cally the 
correlation of within-season county yield 
change to within-season national price 
change. Within-season price change 
is deﬁ  ned as the percent difference 
between the harvest time price and the 
pre-planting time price (an expected price 
measure). Within-season yield change is 
deﬁ  ned as the percent difference between 
harvested yield and expected yield. Con-
verting price and yield to deviation form 
avoids the need to make arbitrary deci-
sions of how to deﬂ  ate historic prices to 
correspond to the detrended yield values 
(Cooper, 2009b).6
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As upland cotton does not have any particularly large areas where the corre-
lation between county yield and national price is highly negative (ﬁ  g. 4), 
the likelihood of systemic underpayments or overpayments is relatively low 
and the beneﬁ  t to the government of a revenue-based payments system in 
addressing payment variability is likely to be more modest. Nonetheless, 
even in the case of a low natural hedge, a revenue-based payment more 
directly targets the economic situation of the farm (assuming revenue as a 
proxy for this measure) than does a price-based payment, all else being equal.   
As with price-based payments, revenue-based payments will vary with 
program details. Still, the guiding principle for a (national or regional) 
revenue-based payment is that the producer is compensated for the difference 
between a reference level of revenue per acre and realized revenue per acre. 
Appendix A demonstrates how payments might actually be made under such 
programs, with payment schemes that are variations on current marketing 
loan beneﬁ  ts (MLBs) and countercyclical payments (CCPs). 
However, a statistical analysis is necessary to predict at the beginning of the 
crop season how payments under a revenue-based commodity support system 
might differ from those under a traditional commodity support structure. 
The next section presents the results of such an analysis for a county-based 
payment approach, demonstrating how the mean, variability, and other char-
acteristics of the statistical distribution of payments can be estimated, and 
how different types of payment program compare to each other on this basis.8
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Stochastic Evaluation of Commodity 
Support Program Alternatives 
Introduction
Farmers are generally averse to risk – in particular, to uncertain and 
economically unfavorable outcomes (Hardaker et al., 2004). While many 
sources of uncertainty have been identiﬁ  ed (Moschini and Hennessy, 2001), 
this report focuses on the exposure of the farmer and the government 
to production (speciﬁ  cally, yield) and price uncertainty, which together 
translate to revenue uncertainty. Given that the producer is unlikely to be 
indifferent (or neutral) to risk, the producer is concerned with more aspects 
of revenue than simply its mean value. In short, risk aversion means that 
a farmer would tend to prefer a commodity support program under which 
some yearly average level of revenue is forgone in return for lower vari-
ability in year-to-year revenue. 
While the risk preferences of individuals have received extensive study 
in the academic literature, the risk preferences of government have not. 
In the case of support payments, risk preferences may be deﬁ  ned as the 
Government’s desire to decrease the variation in payments from projected 
budget levels. But the Federal Government is a large and heterogeneous 
body, and anecdotal evidence suggests that it has no uniform risk prefer-
ence. However, certain program rules suggest that government agencies 
have at least some risk aversion with respect to costs. For example, starting 
with the 1996 Farm Bill, the Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce has used prob-
ability, or stochastic, scoring to estimate farm program costs (Jagger and 
Hull, 1997; Gardner, 1996). In addition, the Ofﬁ  ce of Management and 
Budget requires agencies to use probability scoring for estimating program 
costs if costs are uncertain. 
Regardless of government agencies’ risk preferences with respect to variability 
in payment levels, evaluating program costs in a probabilistic framework can 
identify costs that might not be identiﬁ  ed otherwise. Speciﬁ  cally, given the 
highly stochastic (random) nature of prices and yield (and the many other vari-
ables that may affect prices), estimating program costs based simply on the 
point estimates of variables may not capture full budgetary costs of program 
change (Jagger and Hull, 1997). For example, just because the expected 
season-average price for a crop is greater than the trigger price (loan rate) for a 
marketing loan program does not mean support payments will be nonexistent, 
given that the average can mask prices that fall below the loan rate during the 
loan availability period. 
Probability scoring is a cost estimate procedure that uses different projection 
paths for the key variables that are likely to affect corresponding program 
costs, thereby generating a statistical distribution of program costs. Even 
if the probability scoring provides only the mean of the estimated distribu-
tion of program costs, as it usually does, some aspect of the budgetary risk 
can still be captured. For example, a proposed program may show no costs 
using point estimates but higher costs when the mean is based on a proba-
bilistic analysis. Nonetheless, the estimated distribution of program costs 
(in particular, farm support payments) provides additional information that 9
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may be of policy relevance to the government and of practical relevance to 
producers. For instance, if the government intended to reduce the likelihood 
that payments exceed a certain ceiling, then such an objective could be exam-
ined using the probabilistic approach. 
To gain some insights into the policy implications of revenue support 
programs, this chapter compares the statistical distribution of payments 
from hypothetical revenue-based programs to those from a suite of 
programs similar to the traditional set of commodity support programs. 
While probability-based program analysis, as used in legally required 
government cost estimates, summarizes the distribution of program costs 
into mean estimates, other summary statistics – such as the variance 
and skewness (shape) of the distribution – are useful too. The estimated 
payment distributions have implications both for government policy and 
for farm-level beneﬁ  ts.
Commodity Support 
Program Scenarios
Actual program payments are sensitive to a broad array of program provi-
sions, and seemingly small changes in these can cause large changes in 
payment levels. Hence, to make the support programs comparable, our 
program scenarios are designed to differ only in the fundamental program 
provisions. The goal is to investigate how payments are affected by using 
revenue targets rather than price or yield targets, and not how payments 
are affected by program parameters inherent to these targets. The 
traditional-style program scenario is compared with two revenue-based 
program scenarios, one based (in part) on revenue shortfalls with respect 
to a target revenue, and one based on revenue shortfalls with respect to 
an expected market revenue (see “Appendix B. Technical Details of the 
Stochastic Analysis”).
Traditional-Style Domestic Program Scenario
Our scenario for a generic version of traditional commodity support has 
three components: countercyclical payments (CCP), marketing loan beneﬁ  ts 
(MLB), and disaster assistance (DA) payments. Disaster assistance payments 
are usually based on a shortfall in yield with respect to expected yield, where 
the lost production is valued at an “established” or expected price (see the 
three boxes in this section for representations of these program scenarios 
using ﬂ  ow diagrams). We assume that DA payments operate in this manner, 
but on a permanent rather than ad hoc basis, like a form of crop yield insur-
ance that is free to the producer. As is frequently the case in actual practice 
(e.g., the 2001 and 2002 ad hoc disaster programs), we assume that payments 
are made when the producer’s yield is reduced by more than 35 percent from 
the expected yield. Unlike the MLB, DA payments can be nonzero even if 
harvested yield is zero.10
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Target Revenue Program Scenario 
We base the three components of this county-area revenue program on 
Babcock and Hart (2005) and NCGA (2006), with some minor differ-
ences (e.g., we use futures prices rather than cash prices). The “basic” 
component is a payment per planted acre to cover shortfalls with respect 
to expected revenue per acre, calculated at the county level. Expected 
county revenue is multiplied by a coverage rate between 0 and 1 such 
that, as with an insurance program, less than 100 percent of expected 
revenue is covered.
The “extended coverage” payment per harvested acre is based on a short-
fall in revenue with respect to a target revenue based on a statutory price, 
and provides supplemental coverage over the basic payment. The revenue 
coverage rate for this component is greater than for the “basic” component, 
but still less than 1. As with the “basic” component, the payment rate for 
“extended coverage” is multiplied by the farmer’s planted acreage for the 
current crop year.
The “production-limited” payment is similar to the extended coverage 
payment but applied to a ﬁ  xed base acreage for the farmer, and provides 
supplemental coverage over the extended coverage payment. This payment is 
similar to the CCP in that payment does not require current production. The 
revenue coverage rate for this component is greater than for the “extended” 
component, but still less than 1.12
 12The terms “basic,” “production 
limited,” and “extended coverage” sub-
stitute for the terms Babcock and Hart 
(2005) use, which are “green”, “blue”, 
and “amber,” respectively. These colors 
(“boxes”) are references to categoriza-
tions by the World Trade Organiza-
tion’s Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) 
of domestic subsidies according to 
their impacts on production. Since it 
is impractical to speculate on how a 
proposed program might be notiﬁ  ed 
to the WTO and given the political 
controversy in multilateral negotiations 
over which support programs should 
be associated with each of these WTO 
“boxes,” for the sake of avoiding the 
potential for confusion we avoid using 
the WTO terminology in our scenarios.
Schematic of payments under the traditional-style support program scenario
Farmer’s total payment = CCP + MLB + DA







Target price – direct payment rate
– maximum of loan rate or season
average price
0.65 x farmer’s expected
yield – actual yield
Loan rate – market price
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Market Revenue Program Scenario
The market revenue program proposal has two components: a national 
revenue payment (e.g., Zulauf, 2006; AFT, 2007a) and a supplemental 
county-area revenue payment. The national revenue payment (NRP) is calcu-
lated as a percentage decrease in national expected total revenue with respect 
to national average realized total revenue, times the farmer’s expected 
revenue per planted acre times the farmer’s planted acres.
With the NRP triggered only by national shortfalls in revenue, Zulauf assumes 
that a Federal crop insurance program payment is used to ensure that the 
farmer is covered up to a guaranteed level. However, for the sake of compa-
rability across scenarios, we instead use a supplemental county-area revenue 
payment to ensure that the farmer is covered up to a guaranteed level. 
Comparability of the Payment Scenarios
Our target revenue program operates at the county level. To put each of 
the program scenarios on an equal footing for the simulation, all three are 
constructed to operate at the county level as well.
For the expected and harvest-time prices, we utilize futures prices, as discussed 
in more detail below. In the traditional-style and the target revenue programs, 
2004 levels for acreage and yield serve as base acreage and yield. To calcu-
late beneﬁ  ts in time t, we use the Olympic average of the prior 5 years’ worth 
of yield data from USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), 
which is consistent with the approach used in various insurance products 
Schematic of payments under the target revenue program
Farmer’s total payment = Basic + EC+ PL







Expected county revenue per
planted acre x coverage rate
- county revenue per planted acre
Payment rate per 
acre x farmer’s 
base acres
No payment
Payment rate per 
acre x farmer’s 
harvested acres
No payment
Payment rate per 









Minimum of {target price x expected 
county yield x coverage rate - county
revenue pre acre} and {coverage rate 
x target price x expected county yield}
Minimum of {target price x expected
county yield x coverage rate - county
revenue per acre} and {coverage rate 
x target price x expected county yield}
Note: The coverage rate (value between 0 and 1) in each payment type are designed 
so that the farmer’s total payment per acre does not exceed the target revenue per acre.12
Economic Aspects of Revenue-Based Commodity Support / ERR-72 
Economic Research Service/USDA
administered by the USDA’s Risk Management Agency (RMA), various 
disaster payments administered by the USDA’s Farm Services Agency (FSA), 
and the revenue-based ACRE program passed into law in the 2008 Farm Act.
Programs can be compared against each other in many ways. Given limited 
information on the risk preferences of producers, it seems reasonable from 
a policy standpoint to assume that payment recipients would be reluctant 
to support a revised direct support program unless it provided at least the 
same support levels as the program it replaces. Hence, to narrow the range of 
possible program parameters, we calibrate the models by setting the program 
parameters so that the mean of total annual payments evaluated at each of 
the 31 price-yield points (over 1975 to 2005) is equal across the program 
scenarios. By doing so, we are not favoring one scenario over another with 
respect to the mean of the payment distribution. Given this calibration, 
other characteristics (for example, variance or skewness) of the distribution 
of payments can be compared, as can the program parameters necessary to 
achieve equality of mean total payments across programs. Details of the cali-
bration procedure are presented in Appendix B, as is the methodology for 
estimating payments and the data sources.
Discussion of Results
Table 1 summarizes the results of the stochastic analysis, using 2005 data for 
planted acres and for the expected yield and price against which the price and 
yield deviations are applied. The ﬁ  rst row under each scenario shows mean 
payments from the stochastic simulation and the next row the coefﬁ  cient of 
variation of the payments. The coefﬁ  cient of variation provides a measure 
of variability (the higher the value, the higher the variability) that allows 
for easier comparability across program scenarios than the standard devia-
tion. The overall coefﬁ  cients of variation for the two revenue approaches 
are roughly equal at 0.32 and 0.34. However, the coefﬁ  cient of variation 
for the traditional program scenario is twice as high (0.68), with most of the 
contribution to this value coming from the fully production-coupled MLBs 
(the disaster payments have a higher coefﬁ  cient of variation but account for a 
smaller portion of total payments). 
Schematic of payments under the market revenue program
Farmer’s total payment = NRP + SUP




payment (NRP) Expected national total revenue v
National total revenue
Payment rate per 
acre x farmer’s 
harvested acres
No payment
Payment rate per 







Expected county revenue per planted
acres x coverage rate vªcounty 
revenue per planted acre13
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Among the three traditional-style program payment types, the price-based 
CCP has the lowest coefﬁ  cient of variation (0.53), which is not surprising 
given the hard ceiling on the CCP payment rate. In fact, the coefﬁ  cient of 
variation for the price-based CCP is lower than for the “basic” component 
(1.06) of the target revenue approach, but more than twice the value (0.24) 
of the “production limited” component. This difference is attributed to the 
formula for the “production limited” revenue payment rate (equation B.8 in 
Appendix B) versus the price-CCP payment rate (equation B.1) – the former 
has a more explicit limit on the payment rate than the latter. 
The third row in table 1 presents the 90-percent conﬁ  dence intervals calculated 
from the same bootstrap output. The lower bound of the 90-percent conﬁ  dence 
band for the current-style scenarios includes zero or near-zero payment levels in 
all three payment types, but also several billion dollars at the upper end.13  The 
traditional-style program scenario has a 90-percent lower bound that is more 
than $1 billion lower than for either of the two revenue-based programs, but an 
upper bound that is over $2 billion higher. This indicates that both farmers and 
the Government would face less uncertainty in budgeting for expected payments 
under the revenue-based alternatives examined here.
The Government is concerned with more than just the mean and variance 
of the empirical payment distribution. For example, in comparing program 
alternatives, it would be useful to have information on the probability that 
 13Actual production-coupled corn 
payments vary greatly from year to year. 
For instance, over 1996-2006, actual 
LDPs for the crop year were $0 in each 
of 4 years, but as high as $4.3 billion in 
the 2005 crop year (payment variation is 
less extreme on a ﬁ  scal-year basis).
Table 1
Stochastic analysis of the distribution of corn program payments under 
alternative U.S. programs (2005 expected prices and yields)
 Payment  type
   Extended  Production 
Target Revenue Program  Total  Coverage  Limited  Basic1
Mean payment ($ billion)  3.03  1.16  1.64  0.22
Coefﬁ  cient of variation2 0.32  0.52  0.24  1.06
90% conﬁ  dence interval 
   (lower, upper)  1.62, 4.80  0.39, 2.28  1.06, 2.37 0.02, 0.73
Market Revenue Program  Total  National3 Supplmental
Mean payment ($ billion)  3.17  2.33  0.85
Coefﬁ  cient of variation  0.34  0.430  0.59
90% Conﬁ  dence interval   1.55, 5.09  0.76, 4.06  0.37, 1.97
Traditional-Style Program  Total  P-MLB  P-CCP  Disaster
Mean payment ($ billion)  3.11  1.26  1.67  0.19
Coefﬁ  cient of variation  0.68  1.35  0.53  1.46
90% conﬁ  dence interval   0.38, 7.10  0.00, 4.78  0.00, 2.28 0.02, 0.83
1The “basic” payment covers shortfalls in county revenue per acre with respect to expected 
county revenue per acre. The “extended coverage” payment is based on a target revenue using 
a statutory price, and provides supplemental coverage over the basic payment. The “production-
limited” payment is similar to the extended coverage payment but applied to a ﬁ  xed base acre-
age for the farmer, and provides supplemental coverage over the extended coverage payment. 
2The coefﬁ  cient of variation in this application is a measure of the dispersion of the probability dis-
tribution of revenue per acre that allows comparisons across populations with different means, and 
is the standard deviation of revenue per acre divided by the mean revenue per acre. The smaller 
the coefﬁ  cient of variation, the lower the dispersion relative to the mean value of the distribution.
3The “national” revenue payment rate is based on the difference between national expected and 
actual revenue per acre, and the “supplemental” revenue payment provides additional coverage 
based on a county- level payment rate.14
Economic Aspects of Revenue-Based Commodity Support / ERR-72 
Economic Research Service/USDA
commodity support levels will exceed those agreed to under a multilateral 
agreement on domestic support. The right-hand tail of the frequency distri-
bution (a graph of how may times the bootstrapped payments fall within 
each billion-dollar interval) provides this information. Figures 5a-5c show 
both the frequency of total payments and the subset of payments most likely 
to face payment ceilings in future multilateral agreements on agricultural 
support. For example, the traditional-style scenario shows payments net of 
disaster payments given that disaster payments can under certain conditions 
be exempt from support ceilings (ﬁ  g. 5a). Likewise, under the target revenue 
program, the basic portion of payments could be exempt from support ceil-
ings, and so ﬁ  gure 5b shows payments net of basic payments as well as total 
payments. Figure 5c shows the market revenue payment net of the supple-
mental payment, although this breakdown is not intended to suggest that any 
portion of the market revenue payment be exempt from payment ceilings.
Given the premise of achieving the same mean annual payment level across 
the program scenarios, ﬁ  gures 5a-5c clearly show that the traditional-
style support scenario has a fatter right-hand tail – or higher probability 
of exceeding a support ceiling –  than the two revenue-based programs. 
For example, excluding the portion of payments that may not be subject to 
limits, the two revenue-based programs would exceed $6.5 billion less than 
1 percent of the time, while the traditional-style program would exceed $6.5 
billion in payments 12 percent of the time.
Budgetary Impacts Under 
Alternative Scenarios
This section presents an approach to empirically demonstrating how the 
within-season probability distribution of U.S. domestic commodity support for 
corn differs between traditional-style approaches to support and revenue-based 
support. In general, ofﬁ  cial government assessments of the costs of a program 
that use a probabilistic setting (known as “probability scoring”) present only 
the mean of the probability distribution of program costs. However, other 
summary statistics, such as variance or skewness (shape) of the distribution of 
payments, may provide useful information as well, especially when comparing 
across program alternatives. For the revenue-based support scenarios evaluated 
here, variability around total expected annual payments and the probability of 
high payments are both lower than for the traditional-style approach. These 
results suggest less budgetary uncertainty for the Federal Government and 
easier adherence to multilateral commitments regarding limits to domestic 
commodity support. Of course, the empirical results in this section showing the 
beneﬁ  ts of revenue-based support with respect to the Federal budget pertain to 
the speciﬁ  c program scenarios examined here, and may not necessarily hold for 
program scenarios not examined here.14
Regional Implications of Revenue-Based Versus
 Price-Based Direct Commodity Support
The previous section examined the implications for Federal budgetary 
planning of the three support proposals by summing up the county-level 
payments from the stochastic simulation to the national level. This section 
examines how payments vary by region, focusing (for brevity’s sake) on 
 14For instance, a price-based support 
program that is production-limited (that 
is, not coupled to current production) 
and has a hard ceiling on the effective 
farm price could have a lower coefﬁ  -
cient of variation than a revenue-based 
support program that is production-
limited but does not have a hard ceiling 
on the payment rate.15
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Figure 5a
Frequency of commodity payments for corn – traditional-style program
The traditional style programs more frequently have high payment
Frequency







 $ Billion, 2005 base
MLB, CCP, and disaster payments
MLB and CCP portion of payments only
Figure 5b
Frequency of commodity payments for corn – target revenue program
The target revenue programs produces a tighter range of payments.
Frequency
$ Billion, 2005 base
Total payments
Limited and extended portion of payments








Frequency of commodity payments for corn – market revenue program
Frequency
$ Billion, 2005 base
Total
National revenue portion of payment only









Note: Each bar covers a $500 million range of payments. The taller the bar, the greater the 
number of payments falling in the associated range.16
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the traditional-style program versus the target revenue program. The results 
for the market revenue program are similar to those for the target revenue 
program, however, and can be found in Cooper (2007, 2009b).
Figure 6 shows the coefﬁ  cient of variation for gross corn revenue by county. 
The smaller the coefﬁ  cient, the lower the variation in average county revenue 
per acre relative to its mean. The pattern of groupings in the map suggests that 
the coefﬁ  cient of variation has a signiﬁ  cant regional component. Table 2 pres-
ents average county returns per acre and the associated coefﬁ  cient of variation 
for corn, as summarized by ERS Farm Resource Regions (Heimlich, 2000). 
The table lists both the gross returns per acre (price times yield per acre) as 
well as total gross returns (gross returns plus the per-acre government payment) 
under both the current-style and target revenue programs. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Heartland region has the lowest coefﬁ  cient of 
variation for gross corn returns, indicating its comparative advantage in corn 
production. The coefﬁ  cient of variation for total gross returns is lower under 
the target revenue than traditional-style programs for each region except 
the Fruitful Rim, where it is the same across programs (table 2). For the 
Heartland region, it is almost three times lower. Since the mean returns are 
roughly the same (by design) under either approach, a safety net intended to 
reduce variability in total gross income might beneﬁ  t from a revenue-based 
approach, for corn at least.17
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Figure 7 maps the percentage change in the coefﬁ  cient of variation for total 
gross revenue under the target revenue program versus the traditional-style 
program. The lighter the color, the greater the decrease in variation offered 
by the target revenue program. Areas with high levels of correlation between 
national average yield and county average yield (e.g., the Heartland) tend to 
show a greater decrease in the coefﬁ  cient of variation of the target revenue 
program with respect to the current-style program. In only a few randomly 
occurring counties does the coefﬁ  cient of variation in the target revenue 
program increase over that in the current-style program.
Producer Preferences for Mean Versus 
Variability of Gross Revenue 
If gross revenue plus support payments are a proxy for the annual contribution 
to a grower’s wealth (deﬁ  ned as total gross revenue) and if the only informa-
tion available on estimated payments under various program alternatives is the 
mean level of payments, one would expect the eligible producer to prefer the 
program that offers the greatest mean total gross revenue.15 But what if the 
decision criteria involved variability in payments and gross revenue? While the 
coefﬁ  cient of variation for total gross revenue may help in determining a pref-
erence for mean versus variance, the coefﬁ  cient is only a measure of disper-
sion. By itself, it cannot indicate whether a farmer would prefer a program that 
results in lower mean total gross revenue and lower variability in revenue to 
one that results in higher mean revenue with higher variability.
Economic theory suggests that producers may balance the mean level of total 
gross revenue against the variability in the total gross revenue in deciding 
which support program they would prefer. In particular, almost any individual 
would view an increase in their mean level of total gross revenue as desirable, 
 15As costs of production do not 
ﬁ  gure in the calculation of the support 
payments, we simplify the analysis by 
using total gross revenue rather than 
total net revenue.
Table 2




County target revenue 
payment plus gross 
revenue
Farm resource region















Coefﬁ  cient of 
variation
(percent)
Heartland 61.6 286 15 326 14 330 5
Northern Crescent 13.5 246 16 277 13 277 7
Northern Great Plains  5.8 220 24 248 19 248 11
Prairie Gateway 12.4 241 20 272 16 272 10
Eastern Uplands  1.3 188 22 227 14 236 12
Southern Seaboard 2.7 214 28 251 20 269 11
Fruitful Rim 1.4 226 34 268 15 269 15
Basin and Range 0.1 339 17 380 12 379 9
Mississippi Portal 1.2 241 22 277 17 283 11
Note: The coefﬁ  cient of variation in this application is a measure of the dispersion of the probability distribution of revenue per acre that allows 
comparisons across populations with different means, and is the standard deviation of revenue per acre divided by the mean revenue per acre.  
The smaller the coefﬁ  cient of variation, the lower the dispersion relative to the mean value of the distribution.18
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whereas farmers are typically risk averse and would view increasing variability 
in total gross revenue as undesirable (Serra et al., 2006).
Serra, Zilberman, and Goodwin (2006) present parameter estimates of the 
preferences of Kansas farmers for mean level of returns versus variability in 
returns. To assess whether farmers would prefer the target revenue program 
over the traditional-style program scenario, we apply that preference structure 
to the estimated means and variances in county-level total gross revenue from 
the target revenue-based and current-style payment scenarios. More speciﬁ  -
cally, for a generic corn farmer in each county (that is, on a corn farm with 
a yield the same as the county’s mean), we calculate the farmer’s preference 
level for expected total gross revenue and variability of total gross revenue. 
The farmer’s preference levels are dictated from an equation in which 
beneﬁ  ts to the farmer increase as mean revenue increases and decrease as 
variability of revenue increases.16 If the estimated preference level is higher 
under the target revenue program than under the current style program, then 
a typical farmer in the county is assumed to prefer the former program to the 
latter. Details of this approach to comparing payment programs are presented 
in Cooper (2008). 
The results of the simulation suggest that the target revenue program is 
preferred over the current-style program by representative corn farmers in 60 
percent of counties. While the main purpose of this simulation is to demon-
strate that program preferences depend on tradeoffs between mean payments 
and the variance of payments, results do indicate that farmer preferences for 
 16The last section of Appendix B pro-
vides technical details of this approach.19
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type of support program have a geographic component (ﬁ  g. 8). Comparing 
this pattern with that in ﬁ  gure 3 suggests that farmer preference for program 
type is more complex than a mere a function of the “natural hedge” between 
price and yield. 
There is a pronounced preference for the target revenue program over the 
current-style program in the Southern Seaboard, a region where the natural 
hedge between price and yield is relatively low (ﬁ  gs. 3 and 8). Recall that 
the national price/national average yield correlation for corn is signiﬁ  cantly 
negative, and that the correlation of corn yields in the Southern Seaboard 
with national average yield tends to be fairly low (ﬁ  g. 1). For farmers such as 
these, the potential beneﬁ  ts of a revenue-based versus price-based program 
are higher than for farmers whose yields correlate more closely with national 
aggregate yields, generating more negative correlation between price and 
farm-level yield. 
While the representative farmer shows a preference for the target revenue 
program in most Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio counties, for Iowa this tends to 
be the case only in the eastern portion of the State. This suggests that for 
some Heartland counties, less variable revenue under the target revenue 
program does not fully compensate for a reduction in mean revenue from the 
traditional-style program, which tends to over-compensate for revenue losses 
in areas with more negative price-yield correlations. 
Comparing the mean level of returns to variability in returns ignores farmer 
preferences regarding skewness (shape) of the distribution of revenue. For 20
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example, the entrepreneur may prefer positively skewed revenue distribu-
tions because the likelihood of extremely low earnings is smaller (Fisher and 
Hall, 1969). However, preferences of U.S. farmers for attributes other than 
the mean and variance of income have received little empirical examination 
to date.
The stochastic analysis in this report has attempted to outline the implica-
tions of the statistical distribution of payments for both the government and 
producers. Still uncertain is the extent to which government and producer 
attitudes to risk differ, and whether those differences can be balanced in 
the ﬁ  nal policy outcomes.  For example, a support program that reduces 
the chance of total payments exceeding some ceiling may not be the same 
program that provides the greatest beneﬁ  t to producers.21
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Provisions of Revenue-Based 
Support Determine Much 
The guiding principle for a revenue-based payment is that the producer is 
compensated for the difference between a reference level of revenue per 
acre and a realized (that is, actual) revenue per acre. However, considerable 
scope is possible in crafting the details of revenue-based payment programs. 
Seemingly minor differences in program provisions may have signiﬁ  cant 
impacts on, among other things, payment levels, year-to-year variability in 
payments, and administrative costs. 
Among the program provisions that need to be set is the geographic admin-
istrative unit for the program. That is, are the differences between reference 
and realized revenue to be determined at the national, State, crop district, 
county, or even individual level? The more precisely the program is targeted 
geographically, the closer the payments will match actual farm-level changes 
in revenues. 
At the same time, administrative costs will increase with more precise 
targeting of payments.  Basing payments on the difference between an 
individual producer’s reference (target or expected) revenue and realized 
revenue is likely to be prohibitively expensive. The other extreme would be 
to base payments on the difference between a national reference revenue and 
national realized revenue. While such an approach minimizes administrative 
costs, it potentially ignores even regional variations in revenues. To reduce 
the costs of commodity support under any level of aggregation, the potential 
for overlap of Title I support with Federal crop insurance could be assessed. 
This analysis, in keeping with contemporary farm legislation, assumes that 
payments are not adjusted by costs of production.  Factoring the costs of 
production (COP) into the calculation of payments – as originally suggested 
by the National Corn Growers Association (2006) – raises several problems. 
First, how one determines the costs of production is subjective: what costs 
and categories should be covered, and should they include only ﬁ  xed or vari-
able costs or both?  Second, including COP in the calculation of payments 
may be indefensible from an economics standpoint (Pasour, 1980). In 
particular, government payments tend to get capitalized into the prices of 
inputs (land in particular), thereby raising COP. Hence, if the revenue-based 
program factors in COP, the payment itself will lead to increases in future 
payments (ibid.).
Finally, economic theory suggests that support tied to prices and/or produc-
tion can stimulate more production than would occur without the support. 
While studies have examined the impacts of commodity support on produc-
tion in both the European Union (EU) and the United States (for example, 
USDA/ERS, 2007c; USDA, 2004; Sckokai and Moro, 2006; Goodwin and 
Mishra, 2006; Anton and Le Mouel, 2004; Hennessy, 1998), none have 
addressed the potential production impacts of revenue-based support.17
As with price-based programs, economic principle suggests several avenues 
through which a revenue-based program may have impacts on production. 
For price-based programs such as marketing loan beneﬁ  ts, the more often 
 17An analysis of the potential impacts 
of revenue insurance on output (Turvey, 
1992) found that such insurance could 
increase plantings of higher risk crops.22
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the marketing loan rate is above the market price and/or the greater the loan 
rate over the market price, the greater the effective price of the commodity 
(Westcott and Price, 2001). In other words, the greater the expected differ-
ence between the market price and the loan rate, the higher the effective 
price, and consequently the greater the impact on production.18 Production 
impacts will be lower the less coupled the program is to current production 
(Westcott et al., 2002).
A revenue-based support program could also have production effects, in this 
case by offering the producer a revenue ﬂ  oor via the revenue target. The 
more often the revenue target exceeds the realized revenue, and the greater 
the difference, the more  production is likely to be stimulated. The degree 
of this impact can depend on whether the revenue target is ﬁ  xed or moves 
with the market. The extent of the program’s regional inﬂ  uence on produc-
tion may also be affected by the geographic level at which payments rates are 
set. In addition, price- or revenue-based support programs can also affect the 
producer’s wealth or variability of revenue, which can inﬂ  uence production 
decisions (Hennessey, 1998).
 18The concept of the effective price as 
discussed in this section should not be con-
fused with the “effective price” construct 
that is used in the countercyclical payment. 
The latter simply refers to a program 
provision that prevents the market price 
used in the payment rate calculation from 
falling below the loan rate.23
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Conclusion
At planting time, the prices and yields that will be realized at harvest are 
uncertain, and so any support payments contingent on price and/or yield are 
likewise uncertain. This report examines how the uncertainty in domestic 
commodity support payments for corn may differ between traditional-style 
approaches (deﬁ  ned as price-based payments plus yield-based disaster 
payments) and two revenue-based approaches (target and market). For the 
scenarios developed here, the support program parameters were chosen 
so that the expected value of total national payments is the same across 
the programs. Hence, from a national perspective (e.g., the taxpayer), the 
programs differ only in the variability (or volatility) of payments and in 
differing probabilities of making any particular level of payments. 
Results seem to favor revenue-based payment scenarios over the traditional-
style support. Variability around the total expected annual payment was 
lower, as was the probability of high payments. These results suggest that 
revenue-based support may reduce budgetary uncertainty for the Federal 
Government and better ensure that agricultural support outlays stay below a 
predetermined level.
This report also examined the impact of the support programs on total gross 
revenue per acre (i.e., gross revenue plus the support payment). The variability 
of corn revenue (measured in terms of coefﬁ  cient of variation) at the county 
level in almost all U.S. corn producing counties was lower under the revenue-
based alternatives than under the traditional-style approach. The reduction in 
revenue variability was most pronounced in Corn Belt counties, which tend to 
have a high correlation of county yield with national average yield.
On the other hand, mean revenue-based support may be higher or lower at 
the farm level (and at the county level, as measured in this report) than mean 
revenue from traditional-style support. In many Corn Belt counties, price-based 
support overcompensated on average for revenue losses relative to revenue-
based support. Hence, while revenue-based support scenarios generally reduced 
the downside risk of farming more than did the traditional-style support, farmer 
preferences for type of support would depend on their preferences for increasing 
mean returns versus decreasing the variability of returns.24
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Appendix A. A Nonstochastic Comparison of 
Price- and Revenue-Based Support
Before planting, the producer can only guess at harvested yields and harvest-
time prices due to their stochastic nature (that is, random variation). To 
simplify the discussion of the basic differences between program alternatives, 
this appendix uses a stylized, nonstochastic analysis. In other words, we 
abstract away from price and yield uncertainty by evaluating the differences 
in the programs at the end of the crop year. The section of this report entitled 
“Stochastic Evaluation of Commodity Support Program Alternatives,” imple-
ments an empirical analysis that explicitly addresses the stochastic compo-
nent of prices and yield. This appendix examines two general classes of 
support payments—one with payments tied to current production and one to 
past production.
Price and Revenue-Based 
Marketing Loan Beneﬁ  ts
In simpliﬁ  ed terms, the price-based marketing loan beneﬁ  ts (Price-MLB) 
are based on a payment rate determined by shortfalls in the market price 
with respect to the statutory loan rate, multiplied by quantity of the crop the 
producer places under the loan (see box, “Calculation of Price and Revenue-
Based Marketing Loan Beneﬁ  ts”). In contrast, revenue-based marketing 
loan beneﬁ  ts (Revenue-MLB) are based on a payment rate determined by 
shortfalls in revenue per acre with respect to a statutory target revenue, multi-
plied by the producer’s planted acreage. For simple comparability with this 
Price-MLB, the stylized graphs in this section assume that the Revenue-MLB 
payment rates are determined by average national yield. Additional analysis 
for program scenarios based on lower levels of yield aggregation—in partic-
ular, a county-based program—is presented as part of the stochastic analysis 
in the main body of this report. 
To demonstrate the relationship between prices, yields, and payments, we need 
to consider the relationship between price and yield. Figure A.1 shows price 
per bushel and gross revenue per acre as a function of harvested yield for the 
case of a stylized crop with a signiﬁ  cantly negative correlation between price 
and yield (that is, a correlation approaching -1).1 Note that the “price” curve 
should not be interpreted as a supply or demand function. Instead, each point 
along the curve represents the mean harvest-time price associated with a level 
of harvested yield, given the expected yield and price at planting time.2 In the 
ﬁ  gure, price per bushel and gross revenue per acre are expressed as percentage 
changes from the expected price and revenue at planting time. As indicated 
in ﬁ  gure A.1, harvest-time price tends to fall as harvested yield increases. 
In this example, price decreases faster than yield increases, and hence gross 
revenue per acre falls as yields increase. The strongly negative relationship 
between price and yield means that, as yield increases, the decrease in revenue 
is smaller than the decrease in price, as shown by comparing the revenue and 
price deviation functions in equation A.1. 
Figures A.2 and A.3 show the relationship between Price-MLB payments 
per acre and harvest-time revenue per acre for the stylized crop as a func-
tion of yield and price, respectively. Two target revenue choices are used in 
 1 While we use a stylized crop for 
the sake of generality, Cooper (2008; 
2009b) shows that the depictions in 
the ﬁ  gures in this section can hold for 
certain actual crops, like corn.
 2 This price-yield function does not 
imply a statistical probability associated 
with any point along the line, but is sim-
ply the mean harvest-time market price 
that an analysis of the historical data 
says would be associated with a realized 
harvest. The section of this report on the 
stochastic analysis of program pay-
ments, which predicts at the beginning 
of the crop year the possible costs of the 
support program, assigns probabilities of 
occurrence to price-yield pairs. 25
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For farmer i of a crop in region j in time t, the existing price-based loan deﬁ  ciency 
payment, or the marketing loan beneﬁ  t, is calculated as: 
Price-MLBijt = max{0, LLRjt − ALRjt)} · Aijt·Yijt ,  (A.1)
where the statutorily set local loan rate (LLR) is the national loan rate (LR) adjusted 
by various region-speciﬁ  c (county or other region) and quality factors. The alternative 
loan repayment rate, or ALR, is a USDA-determined market price that varies daily or 
weekly (depending on the crop) according to market conditions, and is adjusted to 
reﬂ  ect quality of the product. Depending on the crop, the ALR may be a county (wheat, 
feed grains, oilseeds), national (peanuts), or world (upland cotton and rice) “posted” 
price. The term max{ 0, (LLRjt − ALRjt)} in equation A.1 is a shorthand way of saying 
that the payment rate = (LLRjt − ALRjt) if LLRjt > ALRjt , or 0 if LLRjt ≤ ALRjt. The 
payments are applied to current production on each farm, which equals harvested area, 
A, times yield, Y. 
For a revenue-based version of equation A.1, the payment would be the difference 
between a target revenue and actual revenue per acre, or
Revenue-MLBijt = max{ 0, (LTRjt − ALRjt·Yjt
 )} ·  
YAPH  / E(Yjt) · Aijt ,  (A.2)
where the statutorily set local target revenue per acre rate, or LTR, is the national 
target revenue rate LR adjusted by various county-speciﬁ  c and quality factors (e.g., 
Miranda and Glauber, 1991). Actual, or realized, yield for the region is Yjt. To 
account for the difference in productivity of producer i with respect to regional 
productivity, the payment is multiplied by the ratio of the producer’s actual produc-
tion history, YAPH, and expected yield for the region in time t, or E(Yjt). 
Calculation of Price and Revenue-Based 




Crop price and revenue deviations as a function of crop yield 
Stylized crop with a significantly negative correlation between price and yield
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Note: The price deviation is defined as the percentage difference between the realized 
price at harvest time and the expected price at pre-planting time. A positive value means 
that the harvest-time price is higher than the pre-planting price. The revenue-per-acre 
deviation is defined similarly.26
Economic Aspects of Revenue-Based Commodity Support / ERR-72 
Economic Research Service/USDA
the ﬁ  gure: one in which the target revenue is set slightly above the expected 
revenue (Example I), and one in which the target revenue is set below the 
expected revenue per acre (Example II). 
In ﬁ  gures A.2 and A.3, the shape of the Revenue-MLB line inversely mirrors 
the shape of the revenue line in ﬁ  gure A.1. The kink in the Price-MLB line 
occurs at the loan rate, and the payment rate falls to zero for prices in excess 
of the loan rate. The Revenue-MLB payment rate for Example II is zero 
when actual revenue per acre is below the target value. 
Revenue-MLB payments go to zero when realized gross revenue is above 
the target revenue level. With the high inverse correlation between crop 
Figure A.2
Possible relationships between two types of marketing 
loan benefits and yield 
Stylized crop with a significantly negative correlation between price and yield
















Direction of decreasing price
Note: For Revenue-MLB (Example I), the target revenue is set to be slightly higher than 
the expected revenue. In Revenue-MLB (Example II), the target revenue is set to be lower 
than the expected revenue. 
Figure A.3
Possible relationships between two types of marketing 
loan benefits and price
Stylized crop with a significantly negative correlation between price and yield














Note: For Revenue-MLB (Example I), the target revenue is set to be slightly higher than 
the expected revenue. In Revenue-MLB (Example II), the target revenue is set to be lower 
than the expected revenue. 27
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price and yield, the Revenue-MLB line changes more slowly with respect to 
revenue change than does the Price-MLB line, suggesting greater predict-
ability for the revenue-based MLB than the price-based MLB under this 
price-yield scenario. 
The general shape of the Price-MLB function per acre as a function of yield or 
price will be the same regardless of crop, as long as the price-yield correlation 
is less than zero. That is, the Price-MLB function per acre will be increasing 
in yield, as increasing yield will always cause some decrease in price (as long 
as price-yield correlation is less than zero). By design, the Price-MLB per acre 
will increase as price decreases, even in cases where the price decrease is less 
than the yield increase (that is, revenue per acre increases).
For the Revenue-MLB, the stylized graphs in ﬁ  gures A.1-A.3 should gener-
ally hold for a crop with a price-yield correlation that is relatively negative 
(that is, closer to -1). For a crop where the price-yield correlation is low 
(that is closer to 0), however, the general shapes of some of the relation-
ships between payments, prices, and yields can differ from those in ﬁ  gures 
A.1-A.3, bearing in mind that the Revenue-MLB payment per acre always 
decreases as revenue per acre increases. 
Now consider a crop with a price-yield correlation closer to 0 (but still nega-
tive), say a crop for which U.S. production is not a signiﬁ  cant driver of world 
price changes for that crop. Here, price changes as a result of yield changes 
are muted relative to the scenario in ﬁ  gure A.1, and consequently, so are 
changes in the Price-CCP. As depicted in ﬁ  gure A.4, the price deviation line 
for such a crop would be less steep than that depicted in ﬁ  gure A.1, and the 
revenue per acre deviation line can actually be increasing in yield.
In this case with the relatively low price-yield correlation, the Revenue-MLB 
payment may actually be seen as decreasing in yield or increasing in price 
(over a feasible ranges of prices and yields). For instance, decreasing yield may 
not be fully offset by increasing price, causing gross revenue per acre to fall.
Figure A.4
Crop price and revenue deviations as a function of crop yield   
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Price and Revenue-Based 
Countercyclical Payments
Price-based countercyclical payments (Price-CCP) are based on a payment 
rate determined by shortfalls in an “effective” price with respect to a statu-
tory target price, multiplied by a ﬁ  xed base acreage and yield. In contrast, 
revenue-based countercyclical payments (Revenue-CCP) are based on a 
payment rate determined by shortfalls in “effective” revenue (effective price 
times season-average yield) with respect to a statutory target revenue, multi-
plied by the ﬁ  xed base acreage and the ratio of the producer’s base yield to 
national average base yield (see box, “Calculation of Price and Revenue-
Based CCPs”). While the base acreage and yield values are calculated 
from historic period(s) and are ﬁ  xed, the payment rate itself is a function of 
contemporary season prices. USDA’s Farm Service Agency (2006a) speciﬁ  es 
how the Price-CCP program determines the base acreage and yield. 
For the sake of creating a direct analogy to the current price-based CCP, this 
appendix considers the revenue CCP program to operate at the national level. 
That is, the payment rate for this revenue-CCP program is determined using 
national average yield in addition to national average price. A beneﬁ  t of this 
approach is that its administrative costs should be no higher than for the 
price-based CCP. A disadvantage—depending on one’s point of view—of 
using a national payment rate in the revenue-CCP payment rate is that the 
correlation between the revenue support payments and farm level revenue is 
likely to be lower than if the payment rate were based on more regionalized 
expected and actual yield. Cooper (2008) ﬁ  nds little difference in the impact 
of the Price-CCP and Revenue-CCP on the variability of total revenue. 
As such, a national-level implementation of revenue-based support would 
not necessarily reduce or eliminate calls for ad hoc disaster assistance. A 
revenue-CCP based on regional yield averages is considered in the stochastic 
simulation in the next section. 
As an aid in contrasting the properties of Price-CCP and Revenue-CCP, 
ﬁ  gures A.5 and A.6 depict an average relationship between payments per 
base acre and harvested yield, price, or gross revenue for the same styl-
ized crop with a signiﬁ  cantly negative price-yield correlation depicted in 
ﬁ  gure A.1. In ﬁ  gures A.5 and A.6, the Price-CCP curve has kinks at the 
loan rate and at the effective target price, which is the target price less 
the direct payment rate. The Price-CCP is linear between the kinks given 
that the payment rate varies in price only. The Revenue-CCP curve slopes 
up to the point where price equals the loan rate, given that the minimum 
price used in the formula is the loan rate; after that, the price point slopes 
down. Lest the reader be perturbed by this seemingly idiosyncratic kink in 
the Revenue-CCP, this characteristic is simply a result of the program not 
permitting the effective price to fall below the loan rate—effective farm price 
falls as yield increases, but only down to the loan rate. The dashed line shows 
what the Revenue-CCP payment would be if the effective market price in the 
payment calculation were allowed to fall below the loan rate. 
In the case of a price-yield correlation closer to 0 (ﬁ  gure A.4), the Price-CCP 
payment per acre would be increasing as yield increases, given low but still 
negative price-yield correlation. However, for such a crop, the price decrease 29
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in response to the yield increase is smaller than the yield increase. As such, 
gross revenue can be increasing as yield increases.
One difference of the Revenue-CCP examined in this section relative to 
the Price-CCP is that the former does not exhibit the same hard cap on the 
payment rate that the Price-CCP does. Namely, the payment rate in the 
Price-CPP has a ceiling equal to the target price (less the direct payment rate) 
minus the loan rate. In contrast, while the effective price in the Revenue-CCP 
is restricted from falling below the loan rate, national yield is not subject to 
a program ﬂ  oor. Hence, the ceiling on the Revenue-CCP payment rate is the 
target revenue per acre itself (times 0.85), although to achieve this payment 
rate would be highly improbable as it would require national average actual 
yield to be zero. Hence, it is possible for the variability of Price-CCP 
payments to be lower than for the Revenue-CCP payment rate. This result 
is not due to the general principle of targeting revenue rather than price, but 
simply to the hard ceiling on the payment rate in the Price-CCP.
In contrast, with the Price-LDP, the payment rate per unit of production 
continues increasing as price decreases, at least in principle. For the same 
mean level of payments then, and if the coefﬁ  cient of variation of revenue is 
less than that of price, the Revenue-LDP should have a lower variability of 
payments than the Price-LDP.
At the same time, depending on what the target revenue is set at, revenue-
based payments can be signiﬁ  cantly lower than price-based payments for 
The total Price-CCP option for a CCP recipient in year t is calculated as:
where TP, LR, and D are the statutory per bushel target price, national average loan 
rate, and direct payment rate, respectively, for a covered crop for which the recipient 
is eligible to receive a CCP payment. For each covered crop, NP is a national market 
price (season-average price for the marketing year). The “base” acreage and yield 
for recipient i are       and      , respectively.
In contrast, a target revenue-based CCP (Rev-CCP) payment is 
where TR and    are the statutory national target revenue per acre and statutory 
national program yield (bu/acre), respectively, for the crop. In particular,      is the 
national average payment yield per base acre under the countercyclical payment 
program. The product Yt ⋅max(NPt ,LR) is the national “effective” revenue per acre 
for year t, where Yt is national average yield.  
The rationale for calculating actual revenue using the “effective price” of max(NPt ,LR) is 
to lower the payment rate as prices fall below the loan rate LR, given that CCP recipients 
can receive marketing loan beneﬁ  ts if they produce the program crop in time t.  
B
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a given market price, yield, loan rate, direct payment rate, and target price 
(ﬁ  gs. A-2, A-3). One potential drawback of setting the target revenue low 
enough that, on average, the revenue-based support would produce a signiﬁ  -
cantly lower payment rate than the price-based support is that it could lead 
producers receiving the revenue-based support to request additional forms of 
domestic support, such as disaster assistance. One way to reduce the prob-
ability of such a scenario occurring would be for the Government to set the 
target revenue to a level that would return, on average across a span of years, 
the same payment level as the price-based program. Even in such a case, 
the beneﬁ  ts to producers and the Government of a revenue-based program 
would be evident in payments that more accurately compensate for revenue 
decreases and (generally) reduce variability in payments from year to year.
However, to set the parameters of the payment programs so that they 
produce, on average, the same level of payments across time requires a 
statistical analysis of the relationship between price and yield. Figures A.2, 
A.3, A.5, and A.6 demonstrate how the programs differ in their response 
Figure A.5
Relationship between two CCP payment types and yield 
Stylized crop with a significantly negative correlation between price and yield
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Figure A.6
Relationship between two CCP payment types and price  
Stylized crop with a significantly negative correlation between price and yield
Payment per base acre ($)
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to revenue changes over an average price-yield relationship estimated from 
historic data. The goal of these charts is to illustrate general properties of 
these payment schemes. To simplify this evaluation, the program payments 
are evaluated at harvest time—that is, prices and yield are realized, not 
expected, prices. 
However, yields and price are stochastic when evaluated at the time planting 
decisions are made. As such, payments are viewed as being drawn from a 
probability distribution. In other words, each price-yield point along the price-
yield lines in ﬁ  gures A.1 and A.4 has an unequal probability of occurring. As 
such, each payment rate deﬁ  ned over the payment graphs in this section does 
not have an equal probability of occurrence. Hence, a statistical analysis is 
necessary to predict at the beginning of the crop season how payments under 
a revenue-based commodity support system might differ from those under a 
traditional commodity support structure. The main body of this report presents 
the results of such an analysis for a county-based payment approach, demon-
strating how the mean, variability, and other characteristics of the statistical 
distribution of payments can be estimated, and how different types of payment 
programs compare to each other on this basis.32
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Appendix B. Technical Details 
of the Stochastic Analysis 
Calculation of Traditional-Style 
Domestic Program Beneﬁ  ts 
The countercyclical payment (CCP) for a producer i of crop j in year t is 
calculated as:
where TP, LR, and D are the statutory target prices, loan rates, and direct payment 
rates, respectively, speciﬁ  ed in farm legislation, NP is a national market price 
(season average price for actual CCPs), 
B A is base acreage, and 
B Y is base yield.
For farmer i of crop j in time t, the marketing loan beneﬁ  t, or equivalently, 
the loan deﬁ  ciency payment, is calculated as: 
(B.2) MLBijt = max{ 0, (LRjt − ALRjt) } ·
H
ijt A  ·
H
ijt Y ,
where LR is the national loan rate adjusted by various county-speciﬁ  c and 
quality factors. The alternative loan repayment rate ALR is the market price 
at the time of harvest. The payments are applied to current production on 
each farm—i.e., harvested area, AH, times yield, YH. 
We assume that the disaster assistance program operates in this manner, but on 
a permanent basis as free crop yield insurance rather than on an ad hoc basis:
(B.3) DAijt = max{ 0, (0.65 · E(
P
ijt Y ) − 
P
ijt Y ) } · E(Pijt) ·
P
ijt A  ,
where 
P
ijt Y  is actual realized yield per planted acre, E(
P
ijt Y ) is the expected yield 
per planted acre, 
P
ijt A  is the planted acreage, and E(Pijt) is the expected price. 
Market Revenue Program Scenario
The market revenue program proposal has two components: a national 
revenue payment (e.g., Zulauf, 2006; AFT, 2007a) and a supplemental 
county area revenue payment. The national revenue payment is calculated 
as percentage decrease in national expected total revenue with respect to 
national average realized total revenue, times the farmer’s expected revenue 
per planted acre times the farmer’s planted acres:
where         is total national revenue for the commodity.
With the NRP triggered only by national-level shortfalls in revenue, Zulauf 
assumes that a Federal crop insurance program payment is used to ensure that 
the farmer is covered up to a guaranteed level. However, again for the sake 
of comparability across scenarios, we instead use a supplemental county area 
revenue payment to ensure that the farmer is covered up to a guaranteed level: 
(B.5)  SUPijt =   max{ 0,  (γ · E(
P
ijt R ) − 
P
ijt R ) ·
P
ijt A   − NRPijt  }
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where γ (0 < γ  < 1) is the desired coverage level. Equation B.5 represents the 
farm-speciﬁ  c revenue payment (based on a payment rate using the farmer’s 
expected and actual revenue, or on the more practical level used in our numer-
ical illustration, a payment rate based on county-level expected and actual 
revenue) less the national revenue payment, NRPijt, that the farmer receives.
Target Revenue Program Scenario 
The “basic” component is a payment per planted acre to cover shortfalls in 
county revenue per acre with respect to expected county revenue per acre in 
the county corresponding to farm i, or: 
(B.6) Basicijt = max{0, [δ · E(
P
ijt R ) − 
P
ijt R  ]} · 
P
ijt A  ,
where 
P
ijt R  =       · 
P
ijt Y  is the county average revenue per planted acre at 
harvest in farmer i’s county,      is the season-average cash price or the 
futures price at harvest, E(
P
ijt R ) is the expected average revenue per planted 
acre at planting time, 
P
ijt A  is the farmer’s planted acreage, and g is the 
coverage rate ( 0 < δ < 1).
The “extended coverage” payment per harvested acre is based on the short-
fall in revenue with respect to a target revenue based on a statutory price, and 
provides supplemental coverage over the basic payment, or:
where 
H
ijt Y  is the average actual harvested yield for farmer i’s county, E[
H
ijt Y ] is 
the expected value,  α  (δ < α <1) is the extended coverage level, and ETPj is 
the statutory target price. Note that 
H
ijt Y  is used here rather than 
P
ijt Y , as per 
NCGA (2006).
The “production-limited” payment is similar to the extended coverage 
payment but applied to a ﬁ  xed base acreage for the farmer, and provides 
supplemental coverage over the extended coverage payment:
where β  (α < β  < 1) is the production-limited box coverage level and       is 
the farmer’s ﬁ  xed planted acreage base.
Calibration of Program Scenarios
Before running the simulation of the distribution of payments given the 
regression results, we calibrate the payment scenarios by setting the program 
parameters so that the average of total annual payments evaluated at historic 
price-yield points is equal across the program scenarios. We set the coverage 
rate γ in the market revenue program to 0.95 to match the upper coverage rate 
β proposed by Babcock and Hart (2005). Similarly, the basic (δ) and extended 
coverage (α) rates are set to 0.70 and 0.85, respectively (ibid). As the only 
parameter to set in the market revenue approach is γ, we choose the rest of 
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annual mean payments that the market revenue scenario produces, or $2.47 
billion. For the target revenue program to produce the same average historical 
payment, an expected target price (ETP) of $2.42 per bushel is necessary. We 
choose the parameters of MLB and CCP so that the ratio of the CCP to total 
payments under the current scenario is similar to the ratio of the production-
limited payments (equation B.8) to total target revenue scenario payments. The 
required loan rate LR is $2.04 per bushel, and with a CCP target price TP of 
$2.35, a direct payment rate D of $0.09 is necessary for the calibration (note 
that for CCPs, decreasing D is one-for-one the same as increasing TP).1
Methodology for Estimating Payments
We estimate the distribution of corn payments for each county, given the yield 
history for that county and the historic relationship between national price and 
national average yield. Payments to county i in crop year t are assumed to be a 
function of planted acres in i at the beginning of t, the parameters of the commodity 
programs, and the stochastic price and yield relationships. For corn especially, 
which has a more negative correlation between national average yield and price, 
one cannot treat the distributions of price and yield as being independent.
In particular, the yield distribution is generated as a percent deviation in 
actual (that is, harvested) yield from expected yield, where the latter is taken 
as the trend yield. The price distribution is taken as the percent deviation in 
the harvest time price from the price at planting time. Regression analysis 
is used to estimate the relationship between the national price deviation and 
the national average yield deviation. Given this estimated relationship and 
given assumptions for the expected yield and expected price, we can then use 
statistical techniques to generate harvest price and aggregate yield distribu-
tions. Details of the approach are in Cooper (2007; 2009b).
Generating the Empirical 
Distribution of Payments
While national average yields are necessary for modeling the price-yield rela-
tionship, county-level yield values are necessary for estimating the commodity 
payments in a county-based program. Adding to the complexity of the analysis, 
county yields are not only stochastic, they are spatially stochastic. That is, yield 
shocks tend to have a systemic component. Similar weather variations can cover 
large geographic regions. For instance, a drought can affect yields across counties 
in a wide region. Furthermore, if a climatic event affects many counties across 
a major production region in a fairly uniform fashion, as it can in the Heartland 
(the USDA’s typology for the Corn Belt [Heimlich, 2000]), it can affect national 
price. However, a weather shock across another region that accounts for a small 
portion of U.S. corn production will have little effect on price.
Given the spatial component to yield shocks, to achieve a realistic estimate 
of commodity payments under yield uncertainty, we must simulate county-
level yield shocks under the assumption that the between-county variations 
in yields are not independent of each other. Our analysis accounts for this 
assumption by maintaining a pairwise relationship between county yields 
in a given year when generating sets of county yields to use in the analysis. 
Details of the approach are in Cooper (2007; 2009b).
 1 We should not be surprised to see 
some deviation of the simulation means 
(ﬁ  rst column of table 1 in the main 
text) from the simple average of $2.47 
billion that we used to calibrate the 
models before running the simulation. 
Parametric choices necessary to arrive 
at the $2.47 billion were calculated 
simply on the basis of the 31 historic 
price-yield data points; the simulation 
mean on the other hand is based on 
an econometric model with a constant 
term and coefﬁ  cients that correct for 
change in the farm legislation and other 
variables over time. In other words, the 
payment estimation procedure using 
simply the 31 historic price-yield data 
points is not an econometric relation-
ship and has no adjustment factors such 
as the change in farm legislation.over 
time. However, this simple approach 
is arguably more reasonable for the 
purpose of determining the parameters 
of the payment programs.35
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Data Sources
Data on county yields, planted acres, and harvested acres for all U.S. counties 
producing corn are supplied by USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service 
(NASS). A tradeoff exists between increasing the number of years from which 
the empirical yield distribution is created and the availability of county-level 
data. One limitation on how many years of data can be used in a county-level 
analysis for the whole country is that NASS county-level coverage prior to the 
mid-1970s is less comprehensive than since that time. For instance, counties 
with continuous NASS planting histories over 1969-2005 accounted for only 53 
percent of total U.S. corn production in 2005. Counties with continuous year-
to-year NASS planting histories over 1975-2005 accounted for over 98 percent 
of total U.S. corn production in 2005.2 We therefore settled on the 1975-2005 
time period. Furthermore, price data before the mid-1970s do not reﬂ  ect China 
and Russia as regular participants in global grain markets, and are unlikely to be 
representative of contemporary global markets. Given the 1975-2005 time span, 
2,784 counties are included in our analysis. 
For the expected corn price at pre-planting time, we utilize the average of the 
daily February prices of the December Chicago Board of Trade corn future 
(CBOT abbreviation CZ) in period t, t = 1975,…,2005. The harvest-time 
price is the average of the daily November prices of the December CBOT 
corn future in period t. These choices of the expected and realized corn price 
are consistent with USDA’s Risk Management Agency (RMA) pricing of 
crop revenue insurance products for corn.
Graphical Depiction of the Econometric Results
Figure B.1 shows the statistical relationship between the price and yield devia-
tions for corn. The downward slope of the ﬁ  tted line in the ﬁ  gure suggests that the 
greater the increase in harvested yield over expected yield (that is, the greater the 
yield deviation), the more likely the deviation in the harvest price from the expected 
price at planting will be negative. In other words, given a base expected yield and 
price, higher realized yields will tend to lead to lower harvest-time prices.
 2 In addition, county-level produc-
tion data are not reported by NASS in 
cases where either the county has no 
acreage planted to the commodity or 
the sample size of farmers is deemed 
too low to report the county data. In our 
analysis, for estimating the county-level 
yields, missing yield data points are 
substituted by crop district estimates. 
Data substitutions are used only where 
necessary for the purpose of estimat-
ing the yield trend equation for each 
county. No payments are calculated 
in t for counties where NASS has not 
reported planted corn acreage in t.
Figure B.1
Within-season price deviation versus yield deviation – corn
The dashed lines are 99 percent confidence intervals for the fitted price-
yield relationship
Percent price difference
Percent yield shock, 2005 base
Actual data points
Yield larger than expected
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Measuring Producer Preferences 
for Support Payment Type
To measure the preference of producers over the mean and variability of 
revenue, the analysis assumes that the producer’s utility (or beneﬁ  ts) func-
tion is deﬁ  ned over these two statistics. In particular, the analysis uses Saha’s 
(1997) ﬂ  exible utility function, 
β θ σ w W u − = , where W is the producer’s 
current wealth (including initial wealth plus current earnings), σ is the stan-
dard deviation of wealth, and θ > 0 and β are parameters. Risk aversion is 
deﬁ  ned by the second moment of the distribution of payments (σ), where risk 
aversion (neutrality) [afﬁ  nity] corresponds to β >(=)[<] 0. For our simulation 
of producer preferences for CCP programs, we use estimates of θ and β for 
Kansas farmers (Serra et al., 2006), or θ = 1.08 and β = 0.74.37
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Appendix C. Relationship Between the Mean 
and Variability of Revenue and the Price-
Yield Correlation 
This appendix examines the impact of the correlation between price and yield 
on revenue. Correlation measures the strength and direction of the linear 
relationship between two variables. The Pearson correlation in particular can 
take on values from -1 to 1, and is a measure of the relationship between two 
random variables. A correlation of -1 means that the two variables move in 
opposite directions in a perfectly linear fashion (i.e., the movements track 
along a straight line), and a correlation of 1 means that the two variables 
move in the same direction in a perfectly linear fashion  A correlation of 0 
means that there is no relationship between the variables. The relationship 
gets stronger as the correlation moves from a value of 0 toward -1 or 1. One 
would expect the price-yield correlation to be 0 or less for crops, with the 
values varying across crops.
Analysis of national average corn yield and price over 1975 to 2005 suggests 
that the correlation between these two variables is -0.71 using the statistical 
approaches discussed in Cooper (2009b, 2007). The correlation between local 
corn yields and price will tend to be less negative than at the national level, 
but still less than zero. For example, in Logan County, Illinois, the correlation 
between county yield and national price is estimated to be -0.68. The value of 
the natural hedge can be relatively low for counties outside the major producing 
regions. For example, in Barnes County, North Dakota, the correlation between 
county yield and national price is relatively low at -0.21. In general, price-yield 
correlations at the farm level are likely to be lower than at the county level, but 
to the extent that farm-level yields are correlated with aggregate yield for the 
region, the price-yield correlation for a farmer in Logan County, Illinois is likely 
to be higher than for one in Barnes County, North Dakota. 
What is the implication for revenue of a nonzero correlation between price 
and yield? This correlation affects both the mean and variability of revenue. 
The main text focused on the effect of the natural hedge (the negative corre-
lation) in stabilizing revenue (that is, decreasing the variability of revenue). 
That the variability of revenue decreases the more negative the correlation 
is between price and yield can be demonstrated by the statistical formula for 
the variability of revenue (e.g., Goodman, 1960), but the complexity of this 
formula is beyond the scope of this report.
What is not generally part of the public discussion of the natural hedge and 
its implications for revenue is that the more negative the correlation between 
price and yield, the lower the mean value of revenue. Say that price per 
bushel = P and yield per acre = Y. Using the formula for the expected value 
product of two correlated random variables (Mood and Graybill, 1963), the 
expected value (or mean) of revenue per acre R, which is P times Y, is 
(C.1) E[R] =E[P]·E[Y] + COV(P,Y),
where E[P] is the expected value of P,  and E[Y] is the expected value of Y. 
COV(P,Y) is a measure of the statistical relationship (covariance) between P 
and Y and equal to the correlation (P,Y) times the standard deviation of P times 
the standard deviation of Y. The correlation is essentially a covariance that has 38
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been adjusted to fall between -1 and 1. Equation C.1 shows that the more nega-
tive the COV(P,Y), the lower the expected revenue, all else being equal. Note 
that no current or proposed revenue-based commodity support plans include 
the covariance term in the calculation of expected or target revenue. Doing so 
would likely lower the probability of a payment being made.
If one is to ﬁ  x revenue, R, at a commodity revenue coverage level, RZ, then we 
can deﬁ  ne the combinations of P and Y that will yield the revenue level RZ, or 
(C.2)  [] ()
[] Y E




This function (known as an iso-revenue line) identiﬁ  es a curve for which, 
given an expectation of yield, the required price is determined so that the 
stated revenue RZ is met (ﬁ  g. C.1). Say that RZ is the revenue guarantee to 
be provided by a revenue support program, and that any actual price-yield 
combination that produces a revenue lower than RZ will trigger a support 
payment that covers the difference. The price-yield combinations that will 
trigger a support payment are those below the curves in the ﬁ  gure. 
Figure C.1 demonstrates the signiﬁ  cance of the statistical relationship 
between price and yield—as deﬁ  ned by the covariance between P and Y—to 
meeting a given level of revenue. The lower line is the combination of prices 
and yields that gives the revenue value RZ when there is no statistical rela-
tionship between P and Y (the covariance and the correlation are zero). When 
the correlation between P and Y is less than 0, the curve moves up, as in the 
case for the correlation of -1 in the ﬁ  gure.
The more negative the correlation between P and Y, for any given value of 
yield, the farmer with the more negative price-yield correlation will need a 
higher price to attain the revenue RZ, all else being equal.1
In summary, there is clearly a tradeoff when it comes to the impact on 
producers of the natural hedge between price and yield: increasing the 
magnitude of the natural hedge lowers the mean value of revenue, but it also 
lowers the variability of revenue. Producer preference for accepting lower 
mean revenue in exchange for lower revenue variability is discussed in 
“Producer Preferences for Mean Versus Variability of Gross Revenue.” 
 1 Before the reader is tempted to draw 
some implications for regional differ-
ences in revenue from ﬁ  gure c.1, note that 
the only difference between the lines in 
the ﬁ  gure is the covariance between price 
and yield—the lines are the same in mean 
price, mean yield, and the standard devia-
tions of price and yield.
Figure C.1
Price-yield relationship over which revenue is constant (hypothetical crop) 




Constant revenue line with 
correlation between price 
and yield = 0












Constant revenue line with 
correlation between price and yield = -1.0
Revenues for the price and yield combinations below the
curves are less than the fixed revenue amount 
Note: The revenue for both lines is fixed at $560, and the standard deviation of price 
and yield are fixed at 1.5 and 40, respectively.39
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